Depth-limited look-ahead search is an essential tool for agents playing perfectinformation games. In imperfect information games, the lack of a clear notion of a value of a state makes designing theoretically sound depth-limited solving algorithms substantially more difficult. Furthermore, most results in this direction only consider the domain of poker. We consider two-player zero-sum extensive form games in general. We provide a domain-independent definitions of optimal value functions and prove that they can be used for depth-limited look-ahead game solving. We prove that the minimal set of game states necessary to define the value functions is related to common knowledge of the players. We show the value function may be defined in several structurally different ways. None of them is unique, but the set of possible outputs is convex, which enables approximating the value function by machine learning models.
Introduction
Depth-limited look-ahead game solving with heuristic evaluation function recently lead to beating human professionals in go [Silver et al., 2017] and poker [Moravčík et al., 2017] . While for perfect infomation games, it was a well established methodology since the very beginning [Shannon, 1950] , creating a theoretically sound depth-limited solving in imperfect-information games is substantially more difficult. One key complication is that, in imperfect-information games, it is not possible to define a value of a single state of a game in isolation. Instead, the value depends on the other states that the players consider likely in a particular situation, on the states that they think their opponent considers likely, and so on.
Existing applications of theoretically sound depth-limited look-ahead game solving are limited to the game of poker. Depth-limited continual resolving in DeepStack [Moravčík et al., 2017] enabled human-speed expert-level game play with computing resources commonly available in a commodity laptop. Brown et al. [2018] used depth-limited solving to create a poker bot, which outperforms the strongest submissions from Annual Computer Poker Competition and can be build form scratch on a common desktop. Alternative approaches for creating top-performing poker bots usually require a supercomputer [Bowling et al., 2015; Brown and Sandholm, 2017] .
This success of depth-limited game solving in an imperfect-information game has never been replicated beyond the Texas hold'em poker domain. Texas hold'em has a very particular structure of the available information. After the initial cards are dealt, all the following actions of the players, as well as chance, are pefectly observable. As a result, the amount of hidden information is constant throughout the game. Furthermore, since the players' moves alternate, it is always clear how many actions has each player performed. However, the standard extensive-form game (EFG) framework describes many games which do not enjoy these properties. For example, in blind chess [Ciancarini and Favini, 2010] , we may learn we lost a piece, but not necessarily which opponent's piece took it. In visibility-based pursuit-evasion [Raboin et al., 2010] , we know the opponent stayed hidden, but not in which direction they moved. In phantom games [Teytaud and Teytaud, 2011] , we may learn it is our turn to play, but not how many illegal moves has the opponent attempted.
Heuristic evaluation function used in DeepStack has been defined in poker terms. The input is the probability of each player holding distinct pairs of cards in their hand in the evaluated situation; the output is the expected number of chips a player can win with their cards if the player played to reach the evaluated situation. It is not clear how to generalize this definition to other games, or even whether the value function they approximate is well-defined.
In this paper, we define value functions analogous the DeepStack's heuristic evaluation for arbitrary extensive form game. We formally prove that the minimal set of game states necessary to define the value corresponds to the common knowledge of the players. Furthermore, we prove several properties of the value functions, which are useful for their approximation using machine learning models. We show that the inputs and outputs of the value functions may be represented in several ways with different structure. None of the input-output mappings is unique, hence, the value functions are, strictly speaking, not always functions. However, this is not a fundamental problem, because the possible outputs form a convex set where any element is a suitable output for depth-limited solving.
Background
In this section, we recall the standard EFG model and the more recent notions of augmented information sets, public states, and subgames.
Extensive-form games
We focus on two-player zero-sum extensive-form games with imperfect information. Based on [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994] , game G can be described by
• H -the set of histories, representing sequences of actions.
• Z -the set of terminal histories (those z ∈ H which are not a prefix of any other history).
We use g ⊏ h to denote the fact that g is equal to or a prefix of h, and extend this notation to subsets of H as A ⊏ B ⇐⇒ (∃g ∈ A)(∃h ∈ B) : g ⊏ h.
• For a non-terminal history h ∈ H \ Z, A(h) := {a | ha ∈ H} is the set of actions available at a .
• N = {1, . . . , N } is the player set, where c is a special player, called "chance" or "nature".
• P : H \ Z → N ∪ {c} is the player function partitioning non-terminal histories into H p , p = 1, . . . , N, c depending on which player acts at h.
• The strategy of chance is a fixed probability distribution σ c over actions in H c .
• The utility function u = (u p ) p∈N assigns to each terminal history z a reward u p (z) ∈ R received by each player upon reaching z.
• The information-partition I = (I p ) p∈N captures the imperfect information of G. For each player, I p is a partition of H p . If g, h ∈ H i belong to the same I ∈ I p then p cannot distinguish between them. For each I ∈ I p , the available actions A(h) are the same for each h ∈ I, and we overload A(·) as A(I) := A(h). We only consider games with perfect recall, where the players remember their past actions and the information sets visited so far.
We focus on two-player zero-sum games, where N = {1, 2} and u 2 = −u 1 . However, this assumption is only truly necessary for results related to optimal game values (Section 5).
A behavioral strategy σ p ∈ Σ p of player p assigns to each I ∈ I p a probability distribution σ p (I) over available actions a ∈ A(I). A tuple σ = (σ p ) p∈N is called a strategy profile.
The expected utility for player i of a strategy profile σ is u p (σ) := E z∼σ u p (z). The profile σ is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if the benefit of switching to some alternative σ ′ p is limited by ǫ, i.e.,
When ǫ = 0, the profile is called a Nash equilibrium. It is a standard result that in two-player zero-sum games, all σ * ∈ NE have the same u p (σ * ). The exploitability expl(σ) of σ ∈ Σ is the average of exploitabilities expl i (σ p ), p = 1, 2, where
Augmented information sets and subgames
To speak about the information available to player i in histories where he doesn't act, we will use the augmented sets I aug p introduced in [Burch et al., 2014] . 1 For p ∈ N and h ∈ H \ Z, we define the p's observation-action history O p (h) in h as the sequence (I 1 , a 1 , I 2 , a 2 , . . . ) of the information sets visited and actions taken by p on the path to h (incl. I ∋ h if h ∈ H p ). Two histories g, h ∈ H \ Z belong to the same augmented information set
We assume all information gets revealed at the end of the game, and thus I aug p ∋ {z} for each z ∈ Z. For I, J ∈ I aug p , we define I ⊏ J ⇐⇒ ∃g ∈ I, h ∈ J : g ⊏ h. Remark 1 (Thick information sets). [Šustr et al., 2019] note that in general EFGs, augmented information sets can be "thick" -i.e. they can contain both some h ∈ H and it's parent g = h. Since it is straightforward to circumvent this issue by only considering the upper frontier ([Halpern and Pass, 2016; Halpern, 1997] ) of each I, we ignore the issue by assuming none of the discussed domains contains thick augmented information sets.
Public states are super-sets of elements of I aug p that capture the information that everybody knows:
A public tree is any partition S of H that forms a tree and is closed under ∼. Its elements are called public states.
Using the concept of public states, [Šustr et al., 2019] define a subgame in EFGs as follows.
Definition 3. A subgame G(S) rooted at a public state S ∈ S is the set {h ∈ H| ∃g ∈ S : g ⊏ h}.
Revisiting reach probabilities and values
In this section, we take a closer look at reach probabilities, list particularly useful versions of this concept, and use them to give several equivalent definitions of the notion of range. We also clarify the properties of and the relationship between expected utilities and counterfactual values.
Reach probabilities
We start by introducing the notation related to reach probabilities in EFGs. The reach probability of a history h ∈ H under a strategy σ is defined as η σ (h) the product of probabilities of taking each action between the root and h. The counterfactual reach probability η σ −p (h) is defined analogously, except that player p now aims to reach h, so the probabilities of his actions are replaced by 1. Finally, player p's reach probability η σ p (h) is the probability that they will play to reach h, i.e. the quantity missing in η
. We now extend this notation to I aug p . Note that naively defining η
for an information set I not belonging to p, will often result in "reach probabilities" that behave nothing like actual probabilities (e.g. having values over 1).
The non-problematic part is the (counterfactual) probability of reaching I ∈ I aug p , which we simply denote as η
Some care needs to be taken with η σ p (I): rather than defining it as the sum over h ∈ I, we set η 1 However, our results would still hold if we replaced I aug p by a different "augmented information partition", i.e. a partition Jp of H which coincides with Ip on Hp and for which (Jp, ⊏) forms a (topological) tree w.r.t. the partial order I ⊏ J ⇐⇒ ∃g ∈ I, h ∈ J : g ⊏ h.
For g ⊏ h, η σ (·) (g, h) denotes the probability of reaching h conditional on already being in g. We compute it analogously to η σ (·) (h), except that we only take the product of probabilities of actions between g and h. For h ∈ I ⊏ J (where I, J ∈ I aug p ) we define the conditional reach probabilities as η
While the denominator in η σ (·) (I, J) and (1) can be 0, we can extend both notions even to unreachable I (Section A.1).
Range in general imperfect information games
In poker, range can be (informally and ambiguously) defined as "the likelihood of having various private cards in a given situation". However, a useful formalization of this concept isn't obvious, in particular in EFGs other than poker. One option would be to set "range of p at S :
" -in other words, "the probability of being in each I, conditional on being in the current public state". However, this definition depends on the strategy of the opponent, and thus a player wouldn't know their own range. (Indeed, just consider the difference between an opponent who plays randomly and an opponent who will always fold unless he is holding two aces.)
Proposition 4 (Equivalent definitions of range). With the knowledge of σ 1 and the game rules, we can calculate the following range-like variables for S ∈ S ( (4) and (5) are two-player games only):
(information set reach probabilities for player 1),
(history reach probabilities for player 1),
(history reach probabilities for player 1 and chance), 
The corollary of Proposition 4 is that among (1)- (3), we are free to use whichever option suits us the best -(3) is the most descriptive, while (1) requires the least space to store. This becomes relevant for example when using range as an input for a neural network. for p ∈ N .
Values of non-optimal strategies
We now define standard and counterfactual values for a given, typically sub-optimal, strategy. We start with histories and history-action pairs and, since the players cannot observe histories directly, proceed by extending the notation to augmented information sets and action-infoset pairs. We then list the properties of these values. The use of letters v and q is inspired by and consistent with [Srinivasan et al., 2018] and (apart from using capital letters to differentiate between values of infosets and histories).
Player p's value of the history h ∈ H under σ ∈ Σ is the expected utility conditional on visiting h:
Analogously, we define the value of an action a ∈ A p (h) taken at h ∈ H p under σ:
As in MDPs, we have v
A very useful variant of these concepts are the counterfactual values [Zinkevich et al., 2008] 
To extend the notation for I ∈ I aug p , we define V σ p (I) as the weighted average of v
We define V 
Motivation: depth-limited solving in imperfect information games
We now describe the CFR algorithm, recall two depth-limited solving algorithms that build on top of it, and discuss their connection to the present paper. For a strategy σ ∈ Σ, I ∈ I i and a ∈ A(I), we define the counterfactual regret for not playing a in I under σ as The Counterfactual Regret minimization (CFR) algorithm [Zinkevich et al., 2008] works by independently minimizingR T i,imm (I) at each I ∈ I. Its average strategyσ T provably converges to a NE [Lanctot et al., 2009, Theorem 1] . CFR usually traverses the whole game tree in depth-first search in each iteration. On the way from the root to leafs, it computes the reach probabilities of individual players and on the way back, it computes the expected utilities and updates the regrets. [Burch et al., 2014] is a "decomposition" variant of CFR that computes the NE strategy for only a limited number of first moves in the game, called trunk. In each iteration, it (I) computes the reach probabilities at the end of the trunk, (II) computes the Nash equilibrium in each subgame rooted at the bottom of the trunk given the fixed reach probabilities, (III) computes counterfactual best response values in the root of the subgame (w.r.t the trunk strategy extended by the subgame NE), and (IV) uses the values from (III) to update the regrets and strategy in the trunk via CFR.
CFR-D
Suppose that µ is a strategy defined in a trunk T ⊂ H. The standard variant of CFR-D solves each subgame G(S, rng µ (S)) at the bottom of T using CFR, this subgame-solving part of the algorithm (SubgameValues method, [Burch, 2017, Section 5.3.1] ) can be instantiated by any mapping ν p :
Eventually, one might wish to use a depth-limited solver that is more scaleable than CFR-D: Continual resolving [Moravčík et al., 2017; Šustr et al., 2019] utilizes the same decomposition principle as CFR-D, but it adds the option to start the search not just from the root, but rather from any public state. DeepStack [Moravčík et al., 2017 ] is a poker-specific instance of CR. To solve subgames, it uses a neural network trained on a large number of sample subgame solutions.
Optimal Value functions in zero-sum games
While the previous section already describes the notion of value of a specific strategy, depth-limited solving requires the notion of "what would happen if we played this strategy for the next few moves and then started playing optimally". To investigate this stronger notion of a value, we restrict our attention to two-player zero-sum EFGs.
The definition of optimal values
We first define a set of strategies that are compatible with what has happened in the game so far and "optimal" for the upcoming decisions. To get a robust notion of an optimal value, we focus on strategies that not only find the NE of the current subgame, but also play optimally even in the whole root of the game (even its unreachable parts). It suffices to use a slightly relaxed version of "subgame perfection", where the strategy Definition 6 (Compatible root-optimal strategy). Let r be a range at S ∈ S. By CROS(S, r) we denote the set of strategies σ ∈ Σ that satisfy rng σ (S) = r and for which V σ p (I) = max{V
By G(S, r) we denote the "unsafe resolving subgame" ( [Burch, 2017] ) obtained by taking G(S) and turning it into a proper game by adding a chance node root S . This root connects to each (topmost, [Šustr et al., 2019] ) h ∈ S via some action a h whose probability is proportional to η µ (h). For fully mixed ranges, there is a straightforward connection between CROS(S, r) and G(S, r). Lemma 7 (iii) uses this connection to prove the existence of CROS(S, r) strategies for general r.
Lemma 7 (Properties of SOS). For every r and S, CROS(S, r) satisfies the following: (i) The restriction σ| G(S) of any σ ∈ CROS(S, r) is a NE in G(S, r).
(ii) For fully mixed r, any NE in G(S, r) extends into a CROS(S, r) strategy.
(iii) CROS(S, r) is non-empty.

This justifies the following definition of optimal value functions:
Definition 8 (Optimal value functions). Let µ be a strategy defined in some trunk T ⊂ H. A function V µ, * p : S × I aug p → R is said to be a optimal value function for p and µ if it satisfies (∀S ∈ S at the bottom of T ) (∃σ ∈ CROS(S, rng µ (S))) ∀I ∈ I 
Properties of the optimal values
Our definition coincides with other standard definitions of value: Indeed, if G is in fact also an (acyclic) MDP (i.e. it has perfect information and no player 2 nodes), then public states coincide with states, their optimal value is uniquely defined, and hence both V p again coincide and are equal to the minimax value of the state. This is true even when G admits simultaneous moves [Bošanskỳ et al., 2016] .
These coincidences are the main reason for considering the normalized values. On the other hand, the non-normalized values are more straightforward to compute. By Proposition 9, IS_Values can be applied in depth-limited solving, which proves that it is indeed a useful notion of a value function:
Proposition 9 (V σ, * c,p can be used for depth-limited solving). For every trunk strategy µ, any optimal counterfactual value function V σ, * c,p satisfies Equation (3). 
To make the computation of values feasible, we use two practical tweaks: Firstly, for a fixed range, we do not use the subgame-optimal strategies, but instead solve the subgame by CFR (w.r.t. the counterfactual values in the whole game). A solution σ found by CFR doesn't necessarily have the properties of CROS(S, r), but, in the limit, it is still good enough for depth-limited resolving (i.e. the corresponding mapping I → V σ p,c (I) is optimal in the sense of Eq. (3)). Second, we approximate the I → V σ p,c (I) mapping by a neural network. Because of numerical instability, very similar ranges might correspond to very different (but still optimal) values. The neural network will converge to a convex combination of these values. The following result shows that both of this tweak still produce data useful for depth-limited solving.
Proposition 10 (Approximating V µ, * c,p by a neural net). Let r be a range at S ∈ S and p ∈ {1, 2}. If V and V ′ are two mappings satisfying Eq. (3), then so does their convex combination W = λV + (1 − λ)V ′ for any λ ∈ (0, 1).
This proves the correctness of the function-approximation step of DeepStack [Moravčík et al., 2017] .
Using infoset values over history values is often beneficial, not only because it reduces the dimension of value-vector, but also because it removes some of the ambiguity:
Proposition 11 (Infoset aggregation reduces ambiguity). If σ, µ ∈ CROS(S, r) satisfy
(I) for each I ∈ I aug p (S). In other words, the optimal infoset values are uniquely determined by the opponent's strategy.
The rationale behind our definition
We now compare our definition of optimal value functions with values in other models, note the ways in which it is more complicated, and illustrate on examples why these complications are necessary. Consider the minimax value of a history h in a perfect-information zero-sum game. This value is uniquely defined, depends only on h (and the subgame below it), and corresponds to any-and-all NE strategies in the subgame rooted at h. In contrast, we have made no claims about the uniqueness of v σ, * p (S, h), this value depends on the strategy above h, and in fact above the whole S, and requires not just any NE, but its particular refinement. We now explain why these these complications are necessary.
Firstly, it is possible to define a single-number value for the whole S and range as the value of the corresponding game G(S, r). This is similar to the approach taken by [Wiggers et al., 2016] in partially-observable stochastic games, where beliefs serve a similar purpose as ranges in EFGs. We choose our definition partly because knowing the value of each individual history/information set seems inherently interesting, but more importantly because unlike public-state values, these values are sufficiently informative to enable depth-limited solving (Proposition 9).
Second, why does the definition of our values use a refinement of Nash equilibrium, and not just any NE? We want our definition of value to capture the notion of "what would have happened, if the game actually reached a specific history/information set?". However, each h in the root of G(S, r) is weighted proportionally to r(h), implying that G(S, r) effectively ignores the parts of G(S) that have zero probability under r. To avoid distorting the values of such h, we only consider the CROS(S, r) strategies, under which even unreachable histories in S have optimal values. For a specific example of this behavior, see the game from Figure 2 (c): The bolded-out strategy (L, B) is a NE, but if player 1 took this to mean that he is free to play R because the "value of L = value of R = 1", they would be in for an unpleasant surprise -upon reaching X, a rational player 2 would not play the "bad" action B. Intuitively, the correct strategy is (L, G), which yields "value of L = 1, value of R = 0". This aligns with our definition of value, since the range at S = {L, R} corresponding to L is (1, 0), and we have (L, G) ∈ CROS({L, R}, (1, 0)), but (L, B) / ∈ CROS({L, R}, (1, 0) ).
Moreover, a value of a history depends on the whole range:
Theorem 12 (Values depend on whole ranges). Let G be an EFG, S ∈ S a common-knowledge public state 2 , h 0 ∈ S, and r a joint range at S. Assume that S isn't thick and r is fully mixed 3 . Then for each g ∈ S, there is r ′ that only differs from r at g, and an EFG G which only differs from G below S, s.t. {v
The intuition behind G is that until we have understood G, we cannot be certain it doesn't behave like G. One could prove a more general version of the statement for thick S and (nearly) arbitrary r and r ′ . However, we believe Theorem 12 illustrates the need for full range sufficiently. Even for a fixed range, the value of a history might be different under different equilibrium strategies:
Example 13. CROS(S, r) strategies that have the same range can still have different history values. This is readily witnessed by the game from Figure 1 , where any player can make a trade-off between the expected utilities at g 1 and g 2 (while still playing optimally).
By Proposition 11, the ambiguity of values can be reduced by aggregating values over information sets. The game from Figure 2 (a) shows that even this aggregation doesn't fully resolve the ambiguity, since the opponent can still make tradeoffs between states that he can't tell apart, but we can (in the depicted game, player 1 has perfect information and hence {A} and {B} are his information sets, but different NE strategies give different values for A and B): One could also wonder whether it perhaps doesn't suffice to only consider ranges that correspond to Nash equilibria, and whether these might not all lead to the same value function. When running CFR-D, the trunk strategy will often be highly sub-optimal -in this sense, we truly do need values even for non-optimal ranges. The game depicted in Figure 2 (b) shows that the latter property doesn't hold either:
Example 15. Suppose that trunk strategies σ and σ ′ can both be extended into NE in the full game and V σ, * p is an optimal value function for σ. Then V σ, * p might not be optimal for σ ′ .
Multi-valued states
Multi-valued states is an approach to value estimation in imperfect-information games developed by [Brown et al., 2018] . The authors propose to fix some equilibrium strategy σ 1 and remember, for each h whose "value" we might need, the vector of values v σ1,ν2 1 (h) for undominated pure strategies ν 2 of player 2 below h. The part of the game below h is replaced by a single decision where player 2 The common-knowledge public states, defined by [Šustr et al., 2019] as the equivalence classes of ∼, are public states that cannot be further split into smaller ones.
3 That is, r(h) > 0 holds for each h ∈ S. 2 picks ν 2 , and receives the corresponding utility. Section 7 of [Brown et al., 2018] contains a nice comparison of multi-valued states and the approach of [Moravčík et al., 2017] . For our purposes, the key differences are that multi-valued states are easier to learn, but require the prior knowledge of an approximate equilibrium strategy σ 1 in the full game G. This assumption is very unrealistic, since the whole point of solving G is to find such σ 1 . However, the approach works well -at least for poker -even when σ 1 is sub-optimal [Brown et al., 2018] . Ultimately, both approaches deserve further investigation, since their effectiveness might vary depending on the specific domain and setting.
Conclusion
We reviewed the properties of reach probabilities and gave a definition of the notion of range that can be applied not just in poker, but in any extensive-form game. We showed that our definition of range is equivalent to several other range-like variables and argued against defining range intuitively as "the probability of the real situation being X conditional on the player seeing Y ". We also listed several equivalent descriptions of a value of a strategy, and contrasted this with a more complicated notion of optimal value. We gave examples illustrating that any definition of optimal value has to take range into account, and that even with a fixed range, optimal values don't have to be unique. However, any vector of optimal values can serve as a heuristic for depth-limited search in imperfect information EFGs.
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Proof. Let G, S, h 0 , r and g be as in Theorem 12. We set r ′ (g) := 0 (and r ′ (h) := r(h) for h = g). We shall prove the theorem by constructing G and showing that it has the desired properties.
We start by making two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that each h ∈ S only has one legal (dummy) action that we denote d. In the general case, each ha, hb would be extended in the identical manner, complicating the notation, but not introducing any actual challenges. Since the public state cannot be further refined, there exists a sequence of histories satisfying
We assume that h p = h j for i = j. We only show the proof in the case where both h 0 , h 1 and h n−1 , h n are indistinguishable by the first player (the proofs of the remaining three cases are similar). (Note that the proof actually only requires the range to be non-zero on each of the histories h p , rather than on the whole S.)
The game G is identical to G at (H \ G(S)) ∪ S, and is defined as follows at {hd | h ∈ S} and below:
• For h ∈ S \ {h p | i = 0, . . . , n}, hd is a terminal node with utility 0 (for all strategic considerations, this replaces S by {h p | i = 0, . . . , n}).
• For h p , i = 0, . . . , n − 1, h p d leads to a matching pennies game (a matrix game with actions U , D for player 1, actions L, R for player 2, and corresponding utilities 1 for U, L and D, R, resp. 0 for U, R and D, L).
• For h n , h n d leads to a game where only player 1 acts, choosing between U (utility 0) and D (utility 1).
• The information sets below h p are defined in such a way that player 1 has to use the same strategy below h 0 and h 1 , h 2 and h 3 , . . . , h n−1 and h n , and player 2 has to use the same strategy below h 1 and h 2 , h 3 and h 4 , . . . , h n−2 and h n−1 (player 2 strategy below h 0 is independent of everything else).
Since h n is unreachable under r ′ , G(S, r ′ ) is effectively a collection of (interconnected) matching pennies games. It follows that the uniform strategy of both players is a Nash equilibrium (clearly, no player can improve his overall utility). On the other hand, it is not a NE strategy in G(S, r) (since player 1 could improve his utility be deviating to "D everywhere").
In particular, 0.5 is an expected utility of h 0 under some NE strategy in G(S, r ′ ). Suppose that some NE strategy σ in G(S, r) has v σ 1 (h 0 ) = 0.5. We will show that such σ has to be uniformly random, and thus prove the theorem by contradiction.
Firstly, if σ 1 wasn't uniformly random at the information set {h 0 d, h 1 d}, player 2 could increase his overall utility by changing his strategy below h 0 to either L or R, and thus σ wouldn't be a NE.
We proceed inductively. We know that u σ 1 (h 0 ) = 0.5, and that in {h 0 d, h 1 d}, σ 1 takes both U and D with non-zero probability. If σ 1 is to be a NE, player 1 has to be indifferent between playing U and D in {h 0 d, h 1 d}. Since v σ 1 (h 0 ) = 0.5, this can only be achieved if σ 2 takes both L and R below h 1 with the same probability. In particular, u σ 1 (h 1 ) = 0.5. Since G forces the strategy of player 2 to be the same below h 1 and h 2 , we get that σ 2 is uniformly random below h 2 as well.
We repeat the argument above for each h p , eventually showing that if the players are to be indifferent between the actions they take with non-zero probability, σ 1 has to be uniformly random in the whole G(S) and σ 2 has to be uniformly random below h 1 , . . . , h n−1 . Finally, if σ 1 wasn't uniform below h 0 (but was below h 1 ), player 1 could increase his utility by deviating to either U or D. This implies that the whole σ is uniformly random, which contradicts our earlier observation.
Proof. Indeed, consider G from the right side of Figure 4 : first to act is the player 2, who decides between preparing for A (PfA) and B (PfB). A chance outcome then randomly (50:50) chooses which of the options A and B actually comes to pass. Finally, player 1 has a dummy action 6 where he observes the chance outcome, but not the action of player 2. Player 1 then receives 0 utility if player 2 guessed the chance event correctly and 1 utility if he guessed incorrectly. The structure of the game implies that any strategy of player 2 is optimal. Moreover, we have V σ 1 (I) = V σ ′ 1 (I) whenever σ 2 and σ ′ 2 are distinct. 6 While the actions of player 1 are irrelevant in G, one can easily modify it such that the inclusion of player 1 is meaningful.
